Krick sent a copy of his Reichelderfer letter to President Kennedy, since it pretty well traced the histoiy of what had been going on in United States weather forecasting circles for the past twenty-five years or so. He was not encouraged by the reply that change was imminent.

The answer came from Professor Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, who had come to his White House post from MIT. Wiesner wrote coolly that he had not been able to find a good scientific explanation of Krick's position in the technical Journals. Krick, in reply, offered Wiesner his organization's thirty years of scientific, academic and engineering experience. He did not hear from Wiesner again.

With the space age beginning and Colonel John Glenn set to orbit the earth, the ability to forecast the weather some time in advance was important to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, especially since weather was involved both at the launch site and the recovery area.

Through the office of Senator Robert Kerr, Chairman of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Krick arranged a meeting with Dr. Abe Silverstein, Director of Space Flight for NASA. Afterward, following his custom, Krick summarized their discussion in a letter to Silverstein, with a copy to James Webb NASA's chief.

Two courses of action were open, Krick suggested-waiting until the meteorological establishment woke up to what can be done, or going ahead with what was already working.

"Since our whole system functions within the framework of ultra long-range weather forecasts of useful accuracy," Krick wrote, "a practical test of the potential of such an approach could be provided by utilizing long-range forecasts for planning NASA space flights. Such a program would avoid the uncertainties of weather resulting in delays or cancellations of scheduled flights. By establishing specifications for each flight operation, periods free of weather complications could be chosen in advance."

NASA's number two man, Deputy Administrator Hugh L Dryden, replied that the U.S. Weather Bureau was supplying NASA with both long- and short-range forecasts for their space shots.

Krick tried again. Mailing off an offer of his forecasting services to Dryden, Krick sent a copy to his old friend, von Karman, asking him to give a hand in persuading NASA officials that he could help sharpen their weather forecasts. If they didn't like his work Krick pointed out, "they could always fire us! Certainly, they could not be criticized for trying, in view of weather difficulties that seem apparent at present."

The weather difficulties Krick referred to had already caused the cancellation of Colonel Glenn's flight on January 27, 1962, from Cape Canaveral. It need not have been, Krick wrote to his representative in Congress, Peter Dominick, who had asked for Krick's views on the forecasts provided NASA by the Weather Bureau. "We were asked by WISN-TV in Milwaukee, one of our clients to make a forecast last Friday for the flight Saturday," Krick explained, enclosing a copy of the script. He had predicted cloudiness for the morning of the shot, "but did not expect this to long enough to require cancellation of the flight."

The weather did, in fact, clear around ten o'clock, contrary the expectations of government forecasters at the launch site, but by that time the flight had already been scrubbed.

The Glenn flight was rescheduled for Thursday, February 1. On Tuesday, January 30, Mutual's KOSI in Denver asked Krick his ideas on the weather for the new date. He predicted that conditions would be unfavorable at both ends: at the launch site: a heavy ground fog; in the recovery area, heavy swells and cloudiness.

A few hours after Krick's broadcast, NASA again cancelled the launching without explanation.

There were more new dates for the launching, and more cancellations. The space agency was still waiting for the right kind weather to turn up when Dryden gave Krick a curt brushoff on his letter repeating the offer of his services. Krick kept his temper and tried again. The answer was still no.

Dryden sent the same word to von Karman, who had indeed taken a hand on Krick's behalf. It was "not practical to substitute Dr. Krick for the U. S. Weather Bureau in the operational for casts for Project Mercury," he wrote.

Colonel Glenn was still on the ground when Krick wrote to Congressman Dominick that the time had come "to get this matter out in the open, I believe that the Weather Bureau and segment of our profession who continue to disclaim that long-range forecasting is possible and push for hundreds of millions of dollars in research money to find a method of doing the job, are not only dishonest, but do a distinct disservice to our country by deterring agencies like NASA from seeking help outside the government where it is sorely needed. Certainly somebody is going to start asking questions before long to find out why NASA can't get a forecast for twenty-four hours."

Colonel Glenn finally got off on his three orbits of the earth on February 20, 1962, more than three weeks later.